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Unutterable Shame/Unuttered Guilt:
Semantics, Aporia, & the Possibility ofMabo
Desmond Manderson
We are a society in which causation-what we do-is understood as deriving
from individual action. But in fact our identity-who we are-is plural. The
failure to recognise the productive aporia inherent in this relation has seriously
confused the debate on Australian history in the wake of, indeed more
accurately in the shadow of, terra nullius. In this essay, I want to distinguish
between guilt and shame as responses to the past and to insist on the
importance of the latter, to demonstrate the paradox within the concept of
shame itself, and to argue that the tension between opposites which it contains
is in fact a force for beneficial social change.
Guilt
In the shadow of terra nullius there have been murmurings of guilt and
susurrations of denial. The Prime Minister John Howard righteously declares
that he refuses to feel linter-generational guilt' over the actions carried out by
White Australians long before he was born: he has said so in relation to the
cases of Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) and he has said so in relation to the
Human Rights Commission report on stolen children. Such a response is his
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reaction to a history of exploitation and appropriation of indigenous peoples
described in the judgment of Justices Deane and Gaudron in Mabo as 'a
national legacy of unutterable shame' (1992: 104). On the one hand a desire for
an impossible utterance, then; and on the other a refusal to utter. Between
these two species of voluble silence, the empty space and the denial of space,
lies a world of difference. Neither is it simply the government which has nailed
its colours to the Endeavour's mast in this way. Throughout the country, in
academic articles (see for example Webber 1995; Patton 1995a and b; Detmold
1993) and magazines (an earlier version of this paper was originally published
as one of a series in Quadrant 1997: 96), in the popular press and on radio
talk-back, Australia finds itself divided on the appropriate response to an
historical agenda which the High Court has been influential in setting.
Those who abjure any gestures of culpability find the accusation ofguilt woolIy-
headed. Our understanding ofguilt is, no doubt, strongly influenced by law. To
feel guilt is to accept personal responsibility for certain actions. It requires a
causal connection between individual acts and bad consequences, the
connection itself being neither an objective fact nor a subjective opinion, but
rather determined by socially constructed norms of relevance (March v.
Stramare 1991: 514-17 per Mason CD. Acriminal act or a tortious wrong alike
demands a finding of guilt if my individual acts caused injury to another.
Theories of causation in the law, whether common-sense or more fully
theorized, insist on precisely this nexus between individual action and direct
consequence (Hart &Honore 1959: 103-59 passim; Haber v. Walker 1963: 358-
59 per Smith].; more complex explications of the idea can be found, for
example, in Epstein 1973: 160-69; Weinrib 1987) at the same time as they
emphasize that the purpose of the inquiry is directed towards not philosophical
semantics but legal pragmatics (March v. Stramare 1991· 509 per Mason J.) as
to the context in which the question of causation arises-a finding ofguilt.
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To feel guilty involves a causal and personal relationship, an attitude to the past
which mandates a stance towards to the future: reparation. One expects the
guilty to atone for their acts, to compensate the victim or pay a fine perhaps:
since the relationship is personal and based on individual action, so also must
be the response. Guilt, in other words, derives ultimately from Aristotelian
notions of corrective justice (Aristotle 1980: V,i at 106-17; see also Weinrib
1992); wrongful action is rectified by individual acts which restore, whether
notionally or otherwise, the status quo ante. Guilt, then, incurs a debt (from
the past) which must be repaid (in the future).
It is clear that John Howard and many others 'refuse to feel guilty' exactly
because they deny personal responsibility or any causal connection for what
happened in the past. But the relationship between past action and present
responsibility is in fact more complicated than such a straightforward syllogism
might imply. It is not self-evident to assume that a denial of reparation flows
from a denial of guilt. 'Inter-generational guilt' is not an impossible concept.
The children of a bank robber are not guilty of theft; but neither are they
entitled to live off illegal earnings with impunity: that debt must still be repaid.
It is a principle that we express not only in law (see for example, Proceeds of
Crime Act, 1987) but in ethics, as for example over the issue of the return of
Jewish property, land, money, and art, confiscated by the Third Reich. Likewise,
although it was previous generations of white Australians who were guilty of
the theft of Aboriginal land through the ideology of terra nullius, their
descendants continue to reap its benefits. The present-day privilege of white
Australians has been built upon the guilty acts of their predecessors.
The denial of guilt which we have seen argued so vociferously over the past
year, does not therefore deny a duty to provide reparation. In Aristotelian
terms, if the wrongful taking of land remains unrectified, the rent in the fabric
of justice likewise cannot be repaired. (Ironically, this is an argument most
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strongly supported by the most conservative of legal writers, since it reflects
their absolute commitment to the sanctity of private property: e.g. Nozick 1974:
4·9, 149·82; Epstein 1979: 499·504; 1985: 3-18,331-50).
Shame
There is however another dimension to this argument, and a more important
one. Guilt is one attitude to the past, but there is another. Shame. The law
knows guilt, but it knows no shame. Nevertheless, it remains an important
element of our moral universe, and its absence from the debate over Wik is
both striking and alarming. In particular, a confusion between the distinct
concepts of guilt and shame bedevils us. Shame differs profoundly from guilt
both in how it relates to the past and the future. Guilt is about taking
responsibility for what we did-it stems from our actions. Shame on the other
hand is about who we are-it stems from our character (Lewis 1992; Goldberg
1991). 'You should be ashamed of yourself' we say. Shame is the feeling which
accompanies an unpleasant revelation about ourselves, rather than simply our
behaviour. But precisely because of the strength of shame, and its connection
to our inner selves, the public use of shame can be a powerful tool in effecting
personal change. It is just these elements in the process of shaming which,
drawing in particular on the sociological work of Braithwaite (1989), have been
developed in recent years as alternatives to legal sanctions.
The idea that shame is about our identity moves us away from the legal
ideology of individual responsibility and asks us instead to acknowledge the
communal wellsprings of our selthood (Lewis 1992; Broucek 1991). Who we
are is not just constructed by each of us alone. We are palimpsests of others'
Writing and rewriting. 'I' am not a parthenogenic god but a product, complex
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and unpredictable no doubt, of my genes, my culture, my background, and my
humanness. To a greater or lesser extent, my identity has been and continues
to be created by overlapping, but particularised, communities of family and city,
of ethnicity and culture, of time and space. Accordingly, therefore, I identify
with these communities-there is a bit of them in me, and me in them.
The logical implications of this are significant. If shame is about identity not
cause; and my identity extends beyond my body to the communities to which I
see myself as belonging; then I can and do feel shame for acts which I did not
cause or bring about for they nevertheless impact upon that identity. Does this
seem counter-intuitive? The point emerges more clearly if we think of the
opposite of guilt and shame. The opposite of guilt is credit; the opposite of
shame is pride. Both are emotions which allow to us feel positively or
negatively about those relevant to our cultural identity although we are not
directly implicated in causing their actions.
Our Prime Minister, for example, may be justly proud of D.G. Bradman, or H.c.
Coombs. In different ways, their actions seem to draw on elements which have
helped to form our own character. When we say that we are proud because
they are Australian, like us, we are expressing in a shorthand way that we
identify with their character because our identity has been forged in the light of
their actions, or out of the same time or soil. The notion of pride allows a
vicarious self-promotion because there is a little part of me I see in them, or
them in me. Pride appeals to the mutual construction of identity within a
community.
But so too does shame. What do I feel when I learn of the theft ofland from its
dwellers, the theft of children from their parents, the theft of life itself from
generations of murdered, or diseased, or impoverished Aboriginal people? I
recognise that I am a product of the society that did those things and that my
identity-who 'I' am-is bound up with that of the oppressors, though they
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were different people living in a different time. If I look honestly in the mirror
of my soul, I see parts of my character in them and in the culture and society
which we have jointly made: it is not always a pretty sight.
Justices Deane and Gaudron claim, in memorable language in their
Mabo opinion, that the treatment of Aboriginal people has left 'a national
legacy of unutterable shame' (1992: 104). It is not simply that Australian history
involved individual acts of tyranny or cruelty. On the contrary, social policy and
cultural orthodoxy encouraged as a norm the treatment ofAboriginal people
in this way. This is why terra nullius, the legal invisibility of a culture, is the
fulcrum around which the pendulum of injustice swings. It was the
grundnorm, epitome and legitimation of a social history which forged our
national identity and the identity of each of us within it, at the same time as it
purged, mythologised, and silenced the Aboriginal peoples. And this normative
and systemic element implicates our identity as a product and constituent of
that society and system. That is why shame is an appropriate response in the
shadow of terra nullius, and why it has remained unutterable.
Ah, but there is a paradox here. We feel shame because our identity is not just
personal: it comes from and includes a family, a society, a culture, a nomos
(Cover 1983: 4-11, 44-46). But why then do I not feel pride in the survival of
Aboriginal people (who are, after all, also 'Australian') instead of shame in their
treatment? The answer is that I do not identify with all cultures equally. The
culture and society in which I see myself and of which I am a product is
predominantly a white Australian one. Yet this differential identification with
some families, cultures, and laws more than others, seems to reproduce exactly
the politics of otherness which produced the shame ofAustralian racism in the
first place.
To adopt the language of deconstruction-and not for the first time in this
debate (Patton 1995a and b; Detmold 1993)-this aporia, then, has two related
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aspects. Firstly, if we really took our cultural identity seriously, why would we
actually feel shame at all? Why would we care about our treatment of others
except that, somewhere, we believe that they are not so radically different from
ourselves after all. The feeling of shame relies on a sense of empathy that
assumes that we are all the same at the same time as it relies on a sense of
identity that assumes that we are not all the same. Conversely, this view of
identity through which we identify with some groups and communities in
preference to others has an overtly destructive aspect. Ironically, the
experience of shame seems to perpetuate a politics of distinct identity which
reinforces the very divisions between 'white' and 'black' Australians of which it
is critical. The aporia of shame is that it resists the very self/other distinction on
which it depends. There is a necessary contradiction at its base.
Reconciliation
Is this merely an academic point, as many critics of deconstruction contend
(e.g. Habermas 1991), or does it illuminate a point of practical significance? To
answer this question, let us turn from the past to the future. Shame differs from
guilt in its stance towards the future as it differs from it in its approach to the
past. Guilt demands reparation-an outward act which undoes the wrongful
act. Shame, because it makes no causal claim, cannot be repaid by action.
Rather, it looks inward. It is a feeling about who we are and it requires
therefore that we change who we are. This is both a more subjective and a
more difficult task.
Shame, because it comes from within, is itself an act. On the other hand, mere
words, the outward form, are inadequate. One suspects that for many people,
outward statements about 'unfortunate acts in Australia's past', from terra
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nullius to the stolen generation, are not accompanied by any genuine 'regret'
(Webber 1995). But words without feeling are an utterance worse than silence.
Such words are, literally, shameless. In their lack of shame and lack of interest,
their contempt and indifference, they establish the very conditions of
possibility for the perpetuation of injustice.
Honest shame, on the other hand, ignites a healing process in which our
changing sense of who we are changes our relationship to others. The youth
who is made to confront an elderly woman he assaulted and robbed may feel
shame. What brings about this feeling is the awareness that she is a specific
human being whose suffering is worthy of his consideration. And the result of
this feeling may be that his sense of identity is changed to include her (see
Braithwaite 1989). His idea of community, the group of people with whom he
identifies, has, we hope, expanded. This change is enduring because it is not
outward acts but rather the sense of self which has been altered. If guilt repays
a debt, shame heals a wound. It expands the boundaries of our identity, our
community, to include those who we previously excluded from it. Acontrite
heart, by altering how we understand ourselves, prevents the conditions of
possibility of shame from ever recurring.
In this way, the dynamics of shame demonstrates that the aporia which a
deconstructive reading offers, is in fact productive and ethical rather than
simply impotent (Derrida 1990, e.g. at 949-51,969-73; Krell 1992; Butler 1990).
Shame relies on a sense of identity to enable it to challenge and to reach out
beyond that identity, thereby to lay the foundations for abroader community in
which the divisive acts of the past will no longer be possible. I feel ashamed of
the treatment of Aboriginal people in the past because I acknowledge that my
identity is bound up with the legal system of white Australia. I was born in the
shadow of terra nullius, and it is who I am. But the shame that I feel is also a
challenge to that identity, a demand to develop a sense of self which
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incorporates black Australians within it. And isn't that a development which
would make discrimination and ill treatment, finally, impossible? Not guilt but
shame is its necessary precondition. Furthermore, shame allows this process to
evolve precisely because it contains within it both the seeds of an identity
politics and the potential for resistance to it (Norris 1988). It is, indeed, the
deconstructive aspects of shame which produce an instability, a generative
paradox, a force for change. As it concerns our relationship to Aboriginal
Australians, this healing process of expansion and concern, of identity
acknowledged and surpassed, goes by the familiar name of reconciliation.
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